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INTRODUCTION 
T H E G R O W T H OF O M B U D S M E N SCHEMES in both the public and private sector 
has been a feature of modern life. In the United Kingdom, these schemes originated 
in the public sector, their origin normally associated with a 1961 report, The Citizen 
and the Administration} That report resulted in the setting up of the office of the 
Parliamentary Ombudsman, or rather, as he was named in the Act, the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Administration, in 1967. Since then, the public sector has acquired 
ombudsmen for local government and the health service. The 1980s and 1990s have 
seen their development in the private sector as a consumer redress mechanism, so that 
they now cover such diverse areas as financial services, estate agents, funeral services 
and legal services. 
The name "ombudsman" reveals the origin of the concept. Ombudsmen are a 
Scandinavian import. The word is Swedish and it means a representative or agent of 
the people, or a group of people. Sweden was the first country to establish an 
ombudsman's office, in 1809, which was to investigate citizens' complaints against 
public officials. A century later, the idea was taken up by another Scandinavian 
country, Finland, which created an ombudsman in 1919. In 1955, Denmark established 
an ombudsman scheme. Norway followed suit in 1963, basing its ombudsman for civil 
administration on the Danish model. It was the introduction of the Danish ombuds-
man, in 1955, which marked the beginning of the world-wide interest in such schemes. 
As well as providing the model for Norway, the Danish scheme was also the model for 
New Zealand, the first country outside Scandinavia to establish an ombudsman. The 
introduction of an ombudsman in New Zealand, a common law country, in 1962, 
sparked off a great deal of interest in the ombudsman concept throughout the world. 
By the 1970s, ombudsmen had appeared in many parts of the world, and by 1983, 
the ombudsman idea had been accepted by almost every country in Western Europe. 
In the past 20 years, there has been an extraordinary spread of ombudsman systems 
across the world, the major exception being the USA. The European Union also has 
an Ombudsman, set up in 1995, who has the unique status of being the only 
supranational ombudsman in existence. His role is to deal with complaints about 
maladministration by European Community institutions and bodies.2 
Why has this institution, established nearly 200 years ago and unheard of outside 
Scandinavia until 150 years ago, proliferated to this extent in the second half of the 
twentieth century? One explanation is the expansion of state activity during and after 
the Second World War, the new concern for the protection of human rights, and the 
growth of public education and participation.3 Ombudsmen came to be seen as useful 
in helping to meet the problem of an expanded bureaucracy in the modern welfare 
state,4 the activities of which had grown in range and complexity. The increase in the 
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powers of discretion given to the executive side of government led to a need for 
additional protection against administrative arbitrariness, particularly as there was 
often no redress for those aggrieved by administrative decisions. 
So, we can see how this 200 year-old institution has developed into new territories 
from its origins in the appointment of an officer appointed by one pole of government, 
the legislature, to handle complaints against the other poles, administrative and judicial 
action. Its modern equivalents have adapted to suit local conditions. The ombudsmen 
themselves, and their operating methods and objectives, vary from country to country. 
This is not surprising, given their different constitutional positions. The popularity of 
the institution can be seen from the way this public sector institution has been 
"flatteringly copied" by the private sector.5 
O M B U D S M E N I N T H E U N I T E D K I N G D O M 
As I have indicated, in the United Kingdom, ombudsmen were introduced in the public 
sector in the 1960s and 1970s, with the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967, the 
National Health Service Reorganisation Act 1973, and the Local Government Act 
1974 6 Y ^ g f j r s t m c u r s j o n m t 0 the private sector7 was in 1981, with the establishment, 
by the insurance industry, of the Insurance Ombudsman's Bureau.8 The banks followed 
in 1986, with the Office of the Banking Ombudsman.9 These were voluntary schemes, 
set up by the industries themselves. Building societies had a different model. Their 
scheme, established in 1987, was set up by statute, the Building Societies Act 1986.10 
In the 1990s, the use of ombudsmen was extended to legal services (1990),11 estate 
agents (1990),12 pensions (1990), investments (1994),13 funeral services (1994),14 rented 
housing (1997).15 
Some of these ombudsmen are not so easily categorised as public or private. For 
example, the Building Societies Ombudsman, although created by statute, had 
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jurisdiction over private sector organisations.16 The Legal Services Ombudsman is a 
complete hybrid: set up by statute,17 publicly funded, accountable through the Lord 
Chancellor to Parliament, her jurisdiction is over the legal profession, which operates 
mainly in the private sphere. The Pensions Ombudsman, too, is a hybrid, imposed by 
statute18 over the pensions industry in both the public and private sectors. In addition, 
it has been argued that he is more like a tribunal than an ombudsman, and his work 
is partly subject to the supervision of the Council on Tribunals.19 Now that the 
ombudsman schemes operating in the financial services area20 are to be combined into 
one Financial Ombudsman Service, it seems that there will be few truly private sector 
schemes left - perhaps only the estate agents and funeral ombudsmen. 
In addition to this plethora of Ombudsmen, there are organisations carrying out 
ombudsman-like functions, which, although they fulfil the criteria21 for acceptance as 
full members of the ombudsman community, do not bear that name. For example, the 
independent organisation dealing with complaints against the police is known as the 
Police Complaints Authority. The Broadcasting Standards Commission provides 
redress for those who complain that they have been unfairly treated or subjected to 
unwarranted infringement of privacy by the broadcasting authorities. This variety of 
nomenclature may cause confusion, and it has been suggested that any organisation 
or individual admitted to full membership of the British and Irish Ombudsman 
Association22 should be required to take the title "ombudsman".23 
On the other hand, there are organisations called ombudsmen,24 which do not satisfy 
all the accepted criteria for ombudsman schemes, usually because they are not 
independent from the body they investigate. By way of example, the Prisons 
Ombudsman does not meet the criteria of independence, because he is appointed by 
and accountable to the Home Secretary. He is also subject to the overall jurisdiction 
of the Parliamentary Ombudsman. This is in no way a criticism of the office-holder, 
who has fought hard to maintain the independence of the office.25 And it may be that 
16
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the status of the Prisons Ombudsman will soon be rectified, as there has been an 
assurance that the post will be put on a statutory basis at the next legislative 
opportunity. 
W H A T IS A N O M B U D S M A N ? 
It should be clear from the above discussion, that there is some concern that the title 
"ombudsman" should be strictly defined. This is not only to avoid confusion, but also 
to ensure that its currency is not undervalued. In 1974, the International Bar 
Association, resolved that an ombudsman was: 
An office provided for by the constitution or by an action of the legislature or parliament 
and headed by an independent, high-level public official who is responsible to the 
legislature or parliament, who receives complaints from aggrieved persons against 
government agencies, officials, and employees or who acts on his own motion, and who has 
the power to investigate, recommend corrective action, and issue reports.26 
This comprehensive, if unwieldy, definition describes traditional, or classical, 
ombudsman schemes. It is clearly not appropriate for private sector or hybrid schemes. 
Even in respect of the traditional ombudsmen, it has been noted that the search for 
definitions disguises the fact that there are "significantly different interpretation of what 
exactly the Ombudsman's functions are" in the world community.27 The focus in the 
United Kingdom is on maladministration, whereas in some countries, the emphasis is 
on human rights. The latter role is often adopted in emergent democracies, where 
ombudsmen are seen as "instruments of good government", "protectors of human 
rights" and leaders of the "fight against corruption that is endemic in many developing 
and transitional economies".28 
In the United Kingdom, ombudsmen are complaint-handlers, providing "an impar-
tial, accessible, informal, speedy and cheap means of resolving complaints".29 It was 
the proliferation of ombudsman schemes which focused attention on the characteristics 
which must be displayed by such complaint-handling schemes, before they are deemed 
to be worthy of the title. 
In 1991, following the United Kingdom Ombudsman conference,30 a working party31 
was set up to agree criteria for the use of the term "ombudsmen". Four key criteria 
were identified: independence from those investigated, effectiveness, fairness and public 
accountability.32 In order to be effective, the ombudsman should be accessible, the right 
to complain should be adequately publicised, and those complaining should be able to 
do so free of charge. Ombudsmen should have adequate powers of investigation, with 
26
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the ability to make recommendations. Where ombudsmen do not possess the authority 
to make binding awards (which is the case in the public sector), they should have the 
moral authority to secure redress. In other words, there should be a reasonable 
expectation that those investigated will comply with the ombudsman's decisions. 
Independence is a very important characteristic of ombudsmen schemes. Ombudsmen 
in the United Kingdom do not see their role as consumer champions, or complainants' 
advocates. It is the fact that they are impartial that gives them their authority, and the 
respect of those who are the subject of their investigations. 
P O P U L A R I T Y OF O M B U D S M A N SCHEMES 
There are several reasons why ombudsmen, who were unknown in this country before 
the 1960s, have expanded, and become such a phenomenal success. First, on grounds 
of cost alone, they are a valuable mechanism for dispute resolution. They are free to 
the users of the scheme, the consumers. In terms of the volume of cases they deal with, 
they are probably cost effective for those funding them, whether they are private sector 
industries, or public bodies. They therefore present good value for money for all the 
parties. Costs are kept to a minimum because, unlike the courts, legal representation 
is neither required nor advantageous. 
Their operating methods also account for their success. Each scheme has a different 
way of operating, but they can all be characterised by two words - informality and 
flexibility. Although ombudsmen must act fairly, they are not constrained by rules of 
evidence. In the private sector, most deal with matters by correspondence. Some allow 
for telephone and/or personal contact. Their procedures tend to be inquisitorial rather 
than adversary. Ombudsmen can attempt a negotiated settlement, and can use 
conciliation techniques. They aim to be accessible and user-friendly. A particular 
advantage for consumers is that there is no risk to complainants using the schemes. The 
complainant has nothing to lose financially by using an ombudsman to deal with her 
or his grievance. Importantly, complainants do not lose their right to take the matter 
to court, if appropriate, after a case has been decided by an ombudsman. 
It will be apparent that the advantages of ombudsmen mirror the disadvantages of 
the courts. In other words, some of the problems of the civil justice system can be 
side-stepped by the use of ombudsmen. It would be a mistake however to assume that 
ombudsman schemes are a panacea for all the problems associated with litigation. 
Although the problems of cost and complexity are overcome, many ombudsman 
systems still suffer from problems of delay. However, ombudsman schemes clearly 
present an alternative to the courts, which many complainants find attractive. This 
attraction is not limited to procedural difficulties. Ombudsmen are also successful 
because they provide remedies where none may be available in the courts. 
A L T E R N A T I V E TO T H E COURTS 
Ombudsmen, as originally conceived in the public sector, were not intended to present 
an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to the courts. They were established to 
deal with grievances where no remedy was available in court, because the matter was 
not justiciable, as no legal right was infringed. The Parliamentary Ombudsman was 
originally established as an adjunct to Parliament, and thus a part of the political and 
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administrative regimes.33 The ombudsman thus supplements "the work of Members of 
Parliament in investigating complaints from members of the public regarding injustices 
caused by maladministration in a Government Department of Agency".34 
The remit of the Parliamentary Ombudsman (along with the other public sector 
ombudsmen) is essentially to provide remedies for maladministration,35 rather than to 
adjudicate legal claims or appeals against the merits of discretionary decisions. 
Maladministration has never been denned in legislation, but was referred to during 
the debate on the Bill which established the Parliamentary Ombudsman as including 
"bias, neglect, inattention, delay, incompetence, ineptitude, perversity, turpitude, 
arbitrariness".36 It is a flexible concept, and to this list can be added: "failure to 
give proper advice, harassment . . . discrimination and failure to handle claims to 
benefit properly".37 Its shifting boundaries means that a "failure to mitigate the 
effects of rigid adherence to the letter of the law where that produces manifestly 
inequitable treatment" can also constitute maladministration.38 Even a departure from 
good practice has been held to be maladministration by the Local Government 
Ombudsman.39 
The public sector ombudsmen, it should be noted, provide additional remedies, 
rather than an alternative mechanism for pursuing legal rights. Indeed, they cannot 
investigate a complaint where there is a legal remedy.40 The grievances they investigate 
have no cause of action in court, except perhaps judicial review. The powers granted 
to the ombudsmen in the public sector thus allow them to address administrative 
problems that the courts cannot effectively resolve. 
In the private sector, many of the schemes were established on a voluntary basis to 
improve the image of the industry,41 although for some, it was the threat of statutory 
intervention42 which encouraged their introduction. By contrast with ombudsmen in 
the public sector, they are generally not confined to issues of maladministration. They 
frequently deal with issues of a contractual nature, where court action, although 
theoretically possible, would be inappropriate, because for example the amount at stake 
is small. Private sector ombudsmen do however go beyond issues of illegality, and can 
33
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base their decisions on a "fair and reasonable" outcome.43 It has been said that they 
are dealing with cases which "go well beyond the type of complaint for which 
ombudsmen were traditionally invoked".44 Moreover, their caseload is no longer 
confined to resolving "comparatively 'minor' grievances".45 The private sector schemes 
therefore often do present a genuine alternative dispute resolution mechanism to the 
courts, both for consumers and the industries concerned.46 
T H E O M B U D S M A N ' S R O L E 
It would be a mistake to conclude from this, however, that the only function of 
ombudsman schemes is dispute resolution. It is true that in both public and private 
sectors, ombudsmen schemes were set up as a method of handling individual 
grievances. Indeed, it has been said that the modern ombudsman institution is 
"primarily a client-orientated office, designed to secure individual justice in the 
administrative state".47 But their work is not confined to this. A l l the ombudsmen in 
the United Kingdom claim that they are also in the business of improving standards 
and practice in the sector or industry over which they have jurisdiction. This is unlike 
the courts, which do not claim to be in the business of improving standards. 
Ombudsmen therefore have two roles. They provide redress for individual grievances, 
but they are also concerned to improve standards.48 Thus, an ombudsman is not 
merely an instrument of redress, but also has the function of quality control.49 By 
investigating individual cases, ombudsmen may highlight more generalised weaknesses 
in practices, rules and attitudes. Uncovering these weaknesses is of advantage to 
individuals who have not complained, because the resulting improvement in the system 
is a generalised benefit. These two functions are not in conflict, nor can they be 
separated. Indeed, it could be suggested that anyone who handles complaints is only 
performing half the task if they are not using the casework function to provide 
feedback to the organisation concerned. This feedback can relate to improvements in 
the way the organisation deals with complaint handling internally, so that fewer cases 
need to involve the ombudsman. It can also relate to improvements in other 
procedures, where for example the complaints reveal a failure in the system. 
O f these two functions, which should take precedence? Most ombudsmen see the 
dispute resolution function as being the primary role. For example, the present 
Parliamentary Ombudsman notes that his "primary objective is to obtain a remedy for 
those who have suffered injustice"; working to ensure good public administration is 
43
 Many ombudsmen are able to use "fairness" as an overriding consideration in making their decisions. Thus, "where the 
legal provisions work against the interests of the consumer most ombudsmen are able to "trump" the legal rules by 
recourse to what is "fair in all the circumstances" or "unfair treatment" or good practice" (R. James Private Ombudsmen 
and Public Law (Dartmouth, 1997), at p. 210. See generally pp. 210-212). 
44
 Ibid, at p. 223. 
45
 Ibid, at p. 225. 
46
 Perhaps the common factor, in relation to the courts, is that both public and private schemes provide an alternative 
means of obtaining access to justice. 
47
 K. Friedman, "Realisation of ombudsman recommendations" (1988) Fourth International Ombudsman Conference Papers. 
Canberra, at p. 105. 
48
 In a world-wide survey of ombudsmen, conducted in 1988, 41 of 43 ombudsmen throughout the world said that one of 
their functions was to improve administrative practices. The same number included proposals for improving legislation 
and administrative rules as one of their functions. Indeed, only six respondents to survey regarded the seeking of 
satisfactory action for the individual as their prime task. The majority (27) believed that this task was as important as 
ensuring that the authorities within their jurisdiction fulfilled their duties (W. Haller, "The place of the ombudsman in 
the world community" (1988) Fourth International Ombudsman Conference Papers, Canberra, at p. 29. 
49
 G. Drewry, "The Ombudsman: Parochial Stopgap or Global Panacea?" in P. Leyland and T. Woods (eds.) Administrative 
Law Facing the Future: Old Constraints and New Horizons (Blackstone Press, 1997), at pp. 88-89. 
20 Nottingham Law Journal 
stated to be "another important aim". There is clearly a strong linkage between these 
two roles, but the question, particularly for the public sector ombudsmen, is whether 
they should be devoting their main energies into resolving individual cases, or to 
tackling the systemic faults in public administration which produce such cases. 
Most individual ombudsman cases have limited significance. On the other hand, 
ombudsmen can with justification be categorised as a "deterrent to maladministration", 
and cumulatively their decisions "help to propagate principles of good administrative 
practice".51 In view if this, it can certainly be argued that ombudsmen should see their 
main task as seeking out systemic causes of injustice in a way courts and tribunals are 
ill-equipped to do.52 Raising standards is the most appropriate way of improving 
consumers' position in general. The resolving of individual disputes, while clearly of 
great importance, should be one of the means to this end, rather than an end in itself. 
R E T H I N K I N G THE SYSTEM 
Ombudsmen are a huge success story. Between them, they have handled thousands of 
cases, and brought redress to thousands of consumers and citizens, where none may 
have been available. They have helped to improve industry practice and administrative 
procedures. They have demonstrated that informal, inquisitorial methods of dispute 
resolution can provide access to justice in both quality and quantity. But the institution 
is not sacrosanct. Indeed, there are few institutions which "work so well that they 
cannot be improved".53 The time perhaps has come when the present system needs 
rethinking. 
In some ways it is their very success which necessitates this. In both sectors, 
ombudsmen have increased and multiplied. Their proliferation has occurred with little 
thought as to how they relate to each other, the civil justice system, or the 
administrative justice system. There is now a need for rationalisation, as this 
proliferation of schemes causes confusion for consumers, as well as jurisdictional 
overlaps and gaps. 
Consumerism is also driving the impetus for change. In the public sector, the 
acceptance that citizens have rights to redress for poor service delivery54 has led to a 
proliferation of internal adjudicator schemes, and internal redress mechanisms. The 
place of the ombudsmen in this new approach to service complaints needs to be 
addressed. In the private sector, there have been calls for a consumer ombudsman, 
which raises the question of the extent to which ombudsmen can solve the problems 
of dubious trading practices. 
F INANCIAL SERVICES 
"Rationalisation" was one reason for the reform of the system of ombudsmen in the 
area of financial services. Eight separate schemes have been integrated, in order to 
rationalise the existing arrangements through the creation of a single ombudsman 
50
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scheme and a single compensation scheme. In this sector, there will now be one single 
scheme, the Financial Ombudsman Service, which will operate under the supervision of 
the Financial Services Authority. Now, not only will consumers be able to have one 
point of entry, whoever the provider of the financial services, but jurisdictional gaps 
and overlaps may also be removed. This should produce a more efficient and 
comprehensive system of investor redress. 
The role of the ombudsman within this new scheme is also of interest. The Financial 
Ombudsman56 is closely attached to the regulator of the industry, the Financial 
Services Authority. Although the authority will not be concerned with individual 
complaints, the ombudsman will report complaints statistics to the complaints 
authority. He will also be expected to report systems failures to the authority. Thus, 
the ombudsman will deal with individual complaints and provide redress to consumers, 
but these will be used (by another body) to perform a regulatory function. Ombudsmen 
are not, and should not be, regulators, but they should see their role as providing a 
means of suggesting improvements in systems, where the casework reveals systems 
failures. 
Current concerns for the those private sector schemes which still exist,57 are in 
relation to the coverage of the schemes, and what should be done about those in the 
industry who are not prepared to join the scheme.58 Outside the public sector, there are 
also questions to be addressed in relation to ombudsman schemes which deal with 
professional services. At present, there is a scheme for legal services. Should other 
professional services operate ombudsman schemes? If so, what is the appropriate role 
for such ombudsmen, how should their jurisdiction relate to the self-regulatory 
mechanisms of the professional bodies for dealing with complaints, and to regulation 
of the profession in general? 
JOINED-UP O M B U D S M E N 
Rationalisation is also needed in the public sector. Here, ombudsman systems devel-
oped when citizen problems could be categorised into central government, local 
government and the health service. The relevant legislation creating the public sector 
ombudsmen assumed that any publicly provided service would be the discrete 
responsibility of either central government, local government or the National Health 
Service. This is no longer valid. There are complaints which cross these jurisdictional 
boundaries. This is especially so in the area of health and social services, but similar 
problems can arise in other areas. 
By way of an example, a recent Local Government Ombudsman investigation59 
involved a complaint about the care an elderly woman received in a private nursing 
home, where her place had been purchased by a local authority. There are some legal 
concerns in relation to the respective responsibilities of local authorities and the health 
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services, which can only receive a definite answer through the courts. However, 
a concern in this case was the fact that the complainant60 was "forced to go to 
two Ombudsmen", the Health Service Ombudsman and the Local Government 
Ombudsman, about what was "essentially, the same complaint". 
Has the time now come to have a single, public sector ombudsman system, bringing 
together the present three systems? Some 25 years ago, the then Parliamentary 
Ombudsman, Sir Alan Marre, recognised that in the long term there would need to be 
consideration of how a more co-ordinated total system, more directly related to the 
interests of the public, could be brought about.61 This idea was examined in 1988, to 
explore whether there should be an integrated service, under which all the ombudsmen 
would operate under the same legislation. The decision then was against recommending 
the creation of a single scheme.62 
The proposal now however is that there should be an integrated service for the 
public sector ombudsmen in England. This recommendation is the result of the 
review63 conducted by the Cabinet Office, which reported on 13 April 2000. The review, 
which was announced in March 1999, was into the organisation of the public sector 
Ombudsmen in England. It was the ombudsmen themselves, who had suggested a 
review, on the basis that the present boundaries between their work no longer reflected 
service delivery in the public sector. The jurisdictional boundaries were confusing for 
the public. The review considered whether the present organisational arrangements of 
the ombudsmen were in the interests of complainants, given the move towards 
integrated provision. 
The review acknowledges that now that there is greater emphasis on collaboration 
in the delivery of public services, there should be a more integrated avenue of redress. 
Although the public sector ombudsmen have always maintained the closest 
co-operation, conducting composite investigations, and re-routing complaints where 
necessary, the time seems to have come for a one-door approach, a "one-stop shop", 
as it is often described, for consumers. The review recommends that a new Commission 
be established,64 which will bring the three ombudsman schemes together. A collegiate 
structure is suggested, with all the ombudsmen being able to cover the complete 
jurisdiction. The review does however acknowledge the advantages in retaining 
functional roles, for example, for local government and the health service. 
Another model would be that adopted in financial services, with a chief ombudsman, 
and regional or sectoral ombudsmen operating under an umbrella structure. The review 
rejected this model, believing that each ombudsman should be responsible for her or 
his own cases, and not subject to any other ombudsman. It was suggested that the new 
integrated service65 would be chaired by one of the ombudsmen for the purposes of 
representing it externally, for management purposes, and when there is a requirement 
to answer to Parliament. The English public sector ombudsmen have warmly welcomed 
the recommendations of the Cabinet Office review. There can be little doubt that an 
integrated service is the way forward for the public sector ombudsmen. 
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T H E C O M P L A I N T S P Y R A M I D 
In addition to integrating the public sector ombudsmen into one system, attention 
needs to be paid to their role and function. One of the considerations of the Cabinet 
Office review was the interaction between the ombudsmen and other relevant 
complaints authorities. In well-established ombudsman systems, the ombudsman is at 
the top of a pyramid of grievance handling machinery, the last port of call when other 
complaint-handling procedures have been exhausted. 
The Citizens' Charter has been particularly influential in the area of consumer rights 
and complaints systems in the public services. There has been a change in the culture 
of service delivery and complaint handling. In the public sector, this has led to an 
intermediate layer of complaint handling, adjudicators funded by the relevant 
department or organisation, but operating independently of them.66 Ombudsman 
systems are now one among many schemes for handling complaints. 
The growth of these systems for internal and external reviews calls into question the 
appropriate function of ombudsmen. In view of this intermediate layer of complaints 
handling, should the ombudsman's function be moving towards that of quality 
assurance for these external review systems? If these external mechanisms are providing 
consumer satisfaction, there will be less need for the ombudsman to become involved 
in routine complaints. The ombudsman could then reserve her or his investigative 
function for the more complex cases, or those that were resistant to resolution at this 
level.67 This approach, sometimes referred to as super-escalated complaints environ-
ment,68 is not without its problems. It can be a lengthy process before there is a final 
outcome in resistant cases. This can be a source of dissatisfaction for complainants, 
which has consequences for the credibility of the system. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
In all this rationalisation and rethinking, what really matters must not be forgotten. 
Any change must be made with the aim of making the system more effective rather 
than simply in order to be seen to making change. Consumers and citizens with a 
justified complaint must be able to obtain redress within a reasonable length of time. 
A rationalised system must not become more bureaucratic. One of the strengths of the 
ombudsman system has been its informality and flexibility. These must not be 
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jeopardised in any proposed reforms. Ombudsmen are a great success. They have 
proved themselves capable of performing the tasks for which they were appointed. One 
of their great strengths is their remarkable adaptability to suit a wide range of political 
and constitutional contexts. Ombudsmen in the U . K . are capable of adapting 
themselves to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. 
